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The Issue 
The Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization (CAIS) program was approved in late 
2003. It now serves as Canada’s sole farm safety net program, having replaced the Net 
Income  Stabilization  Account  (NISA),  Canadian  Farm  Income  Program  (CFIP),  and 
provincial  companion  programs.  However,  the  mechanisms  of  operation  and  actual 
performance of CAIS in providing stability to farm incomes are relatively unknown. In 
particular, to develop expectations of future farm costs and returns and to determine their 
support for CAIS as the sole safety net under the federal-provincial Agricultural Policy 
Framework (APF),  farmers  and their representatives need a concrete understanding of 
how CAIS can be expected to work relative to its predecessors. 
Implications and Conclusions 
CAIS has a number of differences relative to its predecessors as a safety net program. 
First, a producer must experience a loss before a payment can be claimed. CAIS requires 
producer deposits to finance a portion of the payment, with the deepest losses requiring 
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the  lowest  producer-cost  share.  The  program  uses  the  same  measure  of  income 
(production margin) to determine deposits as it does to determine payments. The program 
suffers from moral hazard in its design for farms with supply-managed sales. Empirical 
simulation of the stability in production margin and gross margin using Ontario data under 
CAIS and under its predecessor programs showed that CAIS provided consistently lower 
variability. 
Introduction 
Under the business risk management pillar of the Agricultural Policy Framework (APF), 
previously existing federal-provincial farm income stabilization programs were combined 
into a single program. Thus, the Canadian Farm Income Program (CFIP), the Net Income 
Stabilization Account (NISA), provincial NISA top-up programs (such as Self-Directed 
Risk Management (SDRM) in Ontario), and other provincial companion programs (such 
as Market Revenue Insurance in Ontario and crop insurance enhancements in western 
Canada) were collapsed into a single program. This program is the Canadian Agricultural 
Income Stabilization (CAIS) program.  
As of January 1, 2004 CAIS is officially the sole farm income stabilization program 
in Canada.
2 However, little research has been undertaken on the impacts or effectiveness 
of  CAIS  relative  to  the  safety  net  programs  it  replaces.  Brown-Andison  et  al.  (2003) 
conducted  a  largely  conceptual  analysis  of  what  is  now  CAIS  in  the  final  stages  of 
program  design  and  approval.  That  analysis  found  that  CAIS  offered  design 
improvements  over  previous  programs  and  was  very  likely  to  offer  improvements  in 
stabilization.  Martin  and  Mussell  (2003)  conducted  an  empirical  study  of  the  CAIS 
program as it applied to Ontario agriculture; their study validated the findings of Brown-
Andison et al. and offered suggestions for design improvements. 
The purposes of this article are to outline the basic design and operational elements of 
CAIS and to interpret these design elements in the context of empirical research on the 
impacts of CAIS on Ontario agriculture.  
Program Design 
The CAIS program has three components that differ from previous income stabilization 
programs: 
•  The  measure  of  farm  income  cushioned  under  the  program  is  production 
margin.  It  serves  as  a  trigger  for  both  support  payments  and  producer 
contributions. 
•  Producers make contributions to the program to share financing of triggered 
payments. 
•  Support under CAIS is layered, such that the producer share of triggered 
payments decreases as realized production margin decreases.  Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  A. Mussell and L. Martin 
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Production Margin 
Under  CAIS,  the  measure  of  income  that  is  used  to  trigger  payments  is  production 
margin, calculated using modified accrual accounting procedures. This differs from the 
cash-basis gross margin trigger used in NISA. Production margin is intended to consider 
revenues  and  expenses  that  are  directly  related  to  production.  The  revenue  measured 
under  production  margin  will  tend  to  be  structurally  lower,  and  expenses  structurally 
higher, compared with the accrual gross margin measure used as a trigger under CFIP. 
This is illustrated in table 1 (all tables appear at the end of the article). In particular, 
expenses related to capital equipment and buildings that were eligible under CFIP are not 
eligible under CAIS. In determining payments, the production margin is compared with a 
reference  production  margin,  which  is  based  on  a  five-year  olympic  average.
3  If  the 
realized  production  margin  falls  below  the  reference,  a  claim  is  triggered  for  the 
difference. 
Producer Contributions 
Under  CAIS,  producers  participate  by  making  contributions  that  are  used  to  finance 
claims. Producers make deposits proportional to their reference margins. The minimum 
deposit that a producer must make is that required to finance the producer’s portion of 
payments to restore 70 percent of the reference production margin from a complete loss. 
This  minimum  deposit  amounts  to  14  percent  of  the  reference  production  margin. 
Producers can choose to make deposits above this level to fund program payments. The 
deposit can be cash-flowed over a three-year period. 
Layered Support 
The shares of government and producer funding under CAIS are split according to the 
magnitude of production margin loss experienced. The magnitudes of loss are categorized 
under  CAIS,  with  losses  of  less  than  0–15  percent  and  15–30  percent  of  reference 
allocated into two stabilization layers, and losses of greater than 30 percent of reference 
allocated under the disaster layer. The share of producer funds used to finance payments 
is inversely proportional to the extent of the loss. For losses of 0–15 percent, producer 
deposits must cover 50 percent of claims, with 50 percent provided by government. For 
the  next  15  percent  of  losses  (from  15  percent  to  30  percent  of  reference)  producer 
deposits must cover 30 percent of claims, with 70 percent provided by government. For 
losses in excess of 30 percent of reference, producer deposits must fund 20 percent of 
claims, with the balance coming from government. Claims are limited by the availability 
of producer matching funds, and the payments start in the layer representing the largest 
loss relative to reference (so the greatest government cost share is accessed). In addition, 
CAIS  now  includes  provisions  in  which  government  covers  60  percent  of  “negative 
margins” (eligible revenue less than eligible expenses).  Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  A. Mussell and L. Martin 
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CAIS Program Operation 
Figure 1 illustrates the basic parameters of the program.  The  minimum deposit is the 
producer’s share of a complete loss below 70 percent; as shown, this is 20 percent of 
70 percent, or 14 percent. If the farmer wishes to have a higher level of deposit and move 
to the second stabilization layer, the deposit required is the minimum (14 percent) plus 
30 percent  of  the  next  15  percent  (or  4.5  percent),  for  a  total  of  18.5  percent.  If  the 
producer wishes to have a deposit sufficient to finance claims following a 100 percent 
production  margin  loss,  the  deposit  is  the  above  18.5  percent  plus  50  percent  of  the 
remaining 15 percent (or 7.5 percent), for a total of 26 percent of reference production 
margin. Finally, there is a program cap of $3,000,000 per farm, and a structural cap such 
that government cannot finance more than 70 percent of total losses.
4 
To understand the program better, consider a farm with a reference production margin 
of $100,000. The farm will have the choice to contribute anywhere from 14 percent to 
26 percent of its reference margin.  
•  If the farmer chooses 14 percent, the deposit is $14,000. This follows from the 
fact that the cost-shares are 20 percent producer and 80 percent government 


















































Figure 1  CAIS payment cost shares by level of production margin loss Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  A. Mussell and L. Martin 
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Looked at differently, if a farm whose reference margin is $100,000 had $0 in 
a given year, then the farm’s deposit of $14,000 would be matched 4:1 by the 
government in the disaster tier, and the farm would be restored to $70,000 of 
margin.  
•  If  the  farmer  chooses  18.5  percent  deposit,  then  the  farmer’s  deposit  is 
$18,500. If this farm had a complete loss to $0 margin in a year, then the farm 
would be restored to 85 percent of the reference margin – $70,000 as above, 
and $15,000 from the lower stabilization tier. Of this $15,000, $4,500 is from 
the producer deposit, $10,500 is from the government, and the ratio is 30/70. 
If the farmer chooses 100 percent coverage, (i.e., $100,000) then the farmer’s 
deposit  is  $26,000  (i.e.,  $18,500  from  above  and  50  percent  of  the  next 
$15,000). 
•  If the farmer chooses the 26 percent deposit, (i.e., a $26,000 deposit), and if 
the farm has a complete loss of the reference margin, then the farm should be 
restored to 100 percent of the reference margin (subject to the 70 percent cap), 
85  percent  as  above  and  the  remainder  shared  half  and  half  between  the 
farmer and the government.  
Except for changes in the reference margin, deposits do not change until there is a 
claim; in other words, the deposit is not a premium. If there is no claim for ten years, and 
the reference margin stays at $100,000 for the entire time, the farmer’s total deposit is a 
one-time total of $14,000 (assuming the 14 percent deposit). Also, an important aspect of 
the  proposed  program  design  is  that  payouts  will  be  done  on  a  “bottom  up”  basis. 
Payments start at the level of loss and work up until either the producer’s deposit is used 
up or the producer’s margin is brought back up to the reference margin. This means that 
the greatest proportion of government risk sharing is accessed first. Returning to the farm 
in the example above, assume in a given year the farm’s production margin is 60 percent 
of the reference (i.e., the farm has a 40 percent loss), which in the example is a $40,000 
loss. With deposits of 14, 18.5, and 26 percent, the farmer will receive the following: 
•  The farmer with a 14 percent deposit will receive $26,000 (or 65 percent of 
the total loss) in government payment and receive the return of the entire 
$14,000 of his or her own deposit. This is calculated as follows: 
•  For the $10,000 loss between 60 percent and 70 percent, the producer’s 
share is $2,000 (20 percent), and the government’s is $8,000. 
•  For the $15,000 loss between 70 percent and 85 percent, the producer’s 
share is $4,500 (30 percent) and the government’s share is $10,500. 
•  At  this  point,  the producer  has  received  $6,500  of  the  original  deposit, 
which leaves $7,500. Therefore, government pays another $7,500 to match 
this part between 85 percent and 100 percent.  Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  A. Mussell and L. Martin 
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•  The  total  government  contribution  from  the  three  portions  is  $26,000, 
while the farmer’s share is $14,000, and all of the loss is covered. 
•  Farmers with 18.5 percent and 26 percent deposits would not need to use 
their additional deposits. Therefore, these deposits could be used to secure 
subsequent  levels  of  protection.  In  this  example,  a  farmer  with  an 
18.5 percent deposit has $4,500 left on deposit, while the farmer with a 26 
percent deposit has $12,000 left. This money can then be used as part or all 
of the deposit for subsequent years’ coverage under the program. 
These examples make clear the important economic question on program deposits. In 
the example, deposits of 18.5 percent or 26 percent were clearly excessive (at least in the 
static sense), leaving deposit funds in the account over and above the amount required to 
match the government funding. The 14 percent producer deposit was just sufficient to 
leverage the needed government funding; had the loss been greater, the farmer would not 
have received a program payment to restore the reference margin because he or she would 
have lacked the sufficient deposit.  
CAIS and Supply Management 
As opposed to the case under NISA, farms with sales of supply-managed commodities are 
eligible for CAIS, although under an altered design. This eligibility is based on a farm’s 
percentage of supply-managed sales relative to total farm sales. In the stabilization layers, 
triggered CAIS payments are prorated according to the percentage of farm sales from 
non–supply managed commodities. So, for example, if a farm had non–supply managed 
sales that were 25 percent of farm sales, the farm would be eligible for 25 percent of 
triggered stabilization-layer payments. However, if losses penetrate into the disaster layer, 
all prorating disappears. Thus, if the same farm had losses in excess of 30 percent, the 
prorating would disappear on all payments.    
The pattern is illustrated in figure 2 for a farm with a reference production margin of 
$100,000,  the  minimum  deposit,  and  25  percent  of  sales  from  non–supply  managed 
product. The horizontal axis plots realized production margin, and the vertical axis plots 
the  cushioned  production  margin  accounting  for  the  government  portion  of  the  CAIS 
payment. The figure shows that moving from right to left, as production margin decreases, 
CAIS  payments  are  made  on  25  percent  of  the  loss.  In  the  stabilization  layers,  the 
cushioned production margin is linear in production margin losses. However, once the 
losses  penetrate  the  disaster  layer  ($70,000  on  the  horizontal  axis  in  the  figure)  the 
cushioned production margin kinks upward as the prorating on payments is removed. This 
creates a moral hazard problem in the program. For purposes of illustration, suppose this 
farm  experienced  a  production  margin  of  $75,000  (on  the  horizontal  axis).  The  farm 
would  receive  a  cushioned  production  margin  of  $78,625.  However,  at  a  realized Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  A. Mussell and L. Martin 
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production margin of $65,000, the cushioned production margin is $87,000. Hence the 
moral hazard problem on farms with supply managed sales. 
Performance of CAIS 
As indicated above, the purpose of CAIS is to stabilize farm income, as represented by 
production margin. To test the extent to which CAIS can be expected to be successful in 
stabilizing farm income relative to the programs it replaces, the following analysis was 
conducted: 
•  Income  data  were  collected  from  11,034  continuous  Ontario  NISA 
participants from 1994 to 2001. Table 2 describes the structure of farms in 
the database. The period of the analysis was 1998 to 2004.  
•  The data were grouped according to farm type and farm sales range. 
•  In each case, the actual payments from NISA, CFIP (in Ontario, the Ontario 
Farm Income Disaster Program, or OFIDP), Ontario companion programs, 
and crop insurance were determined. 
•  For the same farms, the implied CAIS program payments were simulated and 
combined with actual crop insurance payments. It was assumed that producer 































































Figure 2  CAIS and the stabilization “kink” under supply management 
Source: Adapted from Martin and Mussell (2003) Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  A. Mussell and L. Martin 
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•  Based on the streams of gross margins and production margins resulting from 
the former set of programs and from CAIS, variability in gross margins and 
variability in production margins were  compared between the two sets of 
safety net programs.  
For  the  simulations,  NISA  government  matching  contributions  were  measured  as 
program payments under NISA; this included any SDRM benefits and any other NISA 
top-ups.
5  Crop  insurance  benefits  were  assumed  to  be  the  same  under  current  and 
proposed programs. Beef operations were divided into cow-calf and feedlot by sorting 
reported “cattle” farms into those with sales greater than $1 million, which were put into 
the feedlot category, and those with sales less than $1 million, which were put into the 
cow-calf  category.  In  1998  and  1999,  additional  payments  outside  the  set  program 
parameters were made under the auspices of OFIDP. These included a rebate of 3 percent 
of eligible net sales and coverage for negative margins for the federal government portion 
of funding. For the purposes of comparison between prior programs and CAIS, these 
payments were removed. Also, under OFIDP adjustments were made for farm expansions 
of 15 percent or more. These adjustments were not removed from previous programs, and 
the simulation of CAIS did not contain provisions for expansions. Thus, as it pertains to 
farm expansions, the comparison is somewhat biased in favour of prior programs. Finally, 
the analysis was conducted prior to the addition of negative margin coverage under CAIS 
and the expansion of the payment cap from $975,000 per farm to $3,000,000, so these 
components were not considered.  
The key aspect in measuring the stabilization ability of a safety net program is the 
extent to which it decreases variation in margins below the average. It is less relevant to 
measure the overall variation in margins (using a measure such as variance or standard 
deviation) because variations in margins above the average have the same influence on the 
measure as variations in margin below the average; meaningful stabilization relates to 
reduction  in  variation  below  the  average  under  no  safety  net  programs.  The  measure 
applied in this analysis is a variant of semi-variance in which the standard deviation of the 
semi-variance  is  computed  to  give  a  result  measured  in  dollars  (rather  than  dollars 
squared); this measure is referred to as semi-deviation. This semi-deviation is measured 
relative  to  average  gross  margin  or  production  margin  with  no  programs.  Thus,  the 
comparison of stabilization between previous programs and CAIS starts with the average 
margin  with  no  programs.  The  safety  net  program  set  that  gives  the  smallest  semi-
deviation provides the best level of stabilization. 
Results 
Tables 3 to 11 present the results for Ontario cash crop, hog, beef cow-calf, feedlot, fruit 
and vegetable, greenhouse, poultry, dairy, and tobacco farms, respectively. In each table, 
the top panel presents results stated in terms of gross margin and the bottom panel shows Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  A. Mussell and L. Martin 
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the results in terms of production margin. The rows in each table refer to sales categories. 
The  columns  in  the  first  group  report  the  margin  based  on  no  programs,  the  prior 
programs, and CAIS. The columns in the second group represent the semi-deviation in 
margins under no programs, the prior programs, and CAIS.  
The tables show that, across a broad cross-section of farm types and sizes, production 
margin is larger and generally more variable than gross margin. That production margin is 
structurally larger than gross margin can be seen by comparing gross margin under no 
programs for a given sales level with production margin under no programs for that same 
sales level.  The difference in variability can be seen by comparing “normal deviation 
below  average,  no  programs”,  for  a  given  sales  level  under  gross  margin,  with  its 
counterpart under production margin. This is a critical finding because, in order for the 
trigger under CAIS to be more sensitive than under the prior programs, production margin 
must be more variable than gross margin. There are sporadic exceptions in which gross 
margin  is  more  volatile  than  production  margin,  notably  fruits  and  vegetables  and 
tobacco. However, these appear to be exceptions to a visible trend. 
The tables also report  average  margin  after support  under the prior programs and 
CAIS. Broad generalizations with regard to average margins between the prior programs 
and CAIS are difficult to make. For the most part, at the lower levels of sales, margins 
under CAIS are higher. In many cases, at higher levels of sales, the margins under prior 
programs  are  higher.  Particularly  on  this  latter  point,  the  results  are  somewhat 
inconsistent. 
Finally, the tables almost universally report semi-deviations in margin that are lower 
under CAIS compared  with the prior program set.   Very few  exceptions to this were 
observed. In many farm types, feedlots for example, the reduction in margin variability 
compared with previous programs is quite significant. Indeed, CAIS appears to provide 
better stability regardless of whether margins are measured as gross margins or production 
margins. The only exceptions to this are greenhouse farms and farms in supply managed 
commodities. Interestingly, the degree of reduction in variability under CAIS relative to 
previous programs appears to narrow for larger farms.  
Discussion 
The  results  of  the  empirical  analysis  suggest  that  CAIS  provides  an  improvement  in 
stabilization relative to the programs it replaces. This is evident from the broad finding 
that  CAIS  decreases  the  semi-deviation  in  margins  relative  to  previous  programs, 
measured as either production margin or gross margin. However, a clear trend in average 
margins, according to either farm type or size, fails to emerge. Some aspects of the design 
of CAIS relative to the programs it replaces help explain this pattern. 
First, under CAIS, in order for a producer to receive government payments, a loss 
must  occur.  Under  NISA  in  the  previous  set  of  programs,  government  payments 
(matching  contributions)  were  triggered  by  producer  contributions  rather  than  actual Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  A. Mussell and L. Martin 
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losses, so payments occurred regardless of loss. Thus, the timing of payments and losses 
are better matched under CAIS than under the prior programs, which will naturally lend 
itself to improved stability.  
Second,  smaller  farms  had  less  eligibility  to  contribute  to  NISA,  and  thus  less 
eligibility for government payments, so fewer payments were received in periods when 
losses occurred. Under CAIS, participation is based on the same measure as the trigger 
(production margin) rather than on sales, so low levels of sales limiting eligibility for 
payment should not be the same problem. Conversely, large farms were limited in terms 
of the stabilization they could receive by the contribution cap of $250,000 in eligible net 
sales under NISA. Since deposits are proportional to production margin under CAIS, and 
there are no limits on deposits, this is far less likely to occur under CAIS.
6     
Conclusions 
This  article  presents  the  basic  design  and  operation  of  the  CAIS  program  and  some 
empirical  evidence  of  its  effectiveness  in  stabilizing  production  margins  and  gross 
margins. The discussion of the CAIS design shows that it differs in key aspects relative to 
its  predecessor  programs.  First,  farmers  must  experience  a  loss  in  order  to  receive  a 
payment; this differs from NISA. Second, deposits are made relative to the same measure 
as  the  trigger  for  program  payments  (production  margin).  Third,  the  leveraging  of 
producer deposits to finance the producer share of program payments is dependent upon 
the  level  of  loss,  with  producer  deposits  used  to  fund  payments  with  the  greatest 
proportion of government share first. Unlike prior programs, access is granted to supply 
managed commodities, although the program is poorly designed in this regard. 
Empirical simulation of CAIS compared with previous programs based on records 
from continuous Ontario NISA participants shows the following. First, production margin 
is structurally higher and more variable than gross margin as a payment trigger. Second, 
clear  conclusions  cannot  be  drawn  on  the  magnitudes  of  average  gross  margins  and 
production  margins  under  CAIS  as  compared  to  these  margins  under  the  previous 
programs.  Finally,  the  results  are  robust  in  showing  that  variability  in  margins,  as 
measured  by  semi-deviation,  was  lower  under  CAIS  than  under  the  programs  that  it 
replaces.  Thus, if the purpose of farm safety net programs is to stabilize  either gross 
margin or production margin, Ontario data suggest that CAIS is an improvement over 
previous programs.     Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  A. Mussell and L. Martin 
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Table 1  Eligible Income and Expenses under Production Margin and Gross Margin 
NISA 




Total A  NISA qualifying commodities and program payments  X  X 
Total B  NISA non-qualifying commodities and program payments  X  X 
9540  Other program payments*       
9544  Disaster assistance payments       
9574  Rebates for eligible expenses  X  X 
9575  Rebates for non-eligible expenses       
9601  Contract work  X    
9605  Patronage dividends       
9607  Interest       
9610  Gravel       
9611  Trucking  X    
9612  Resales of commodities purchased       
9613  Leases       
9614  Machine rentals       
9600  Other       




Total D  NISA qualifying commodity purchases  X  X 
9661  Containers and twine  X  X 
9662  Fertilizers and lime  X  X 
9663  Pesticides  X  X 
9665  Insurance premiums (crop)  X  X 
9713  Veterinary fees, medicine, AI fees  X  X 
9714  Minerals and salts  X  X 
9760  Machinery (repairs, licences, insurance)  X    
9764  Machinery (gasoline, diesel fuel, oil)  X  X 
9792  Advertising and marketing costs  X    
9795  Building and fence repairs  X    
9798  Agricultural contract work  X    
9799  Electricity  X  X 
9801  Freight and trucking  X  X 
9802  Heating fuel  X  X 
9804  Other insurance premiums  X    
9807  Memberships/subscription fees  X    
9808  Office expenses  X    
9809  Legal and accounting fees  X   
       (continued…) Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  A. Mussell and L. Martin 
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Table 1 Eligible Income and Expenses under Production Margin and Gross Margin (…continued) 




9815  Salaries (other than spouse)  X  X 
9816  Salaries paid to dependants  X    
9819  Motor vehicle expenses  X   
9820  Small tools  X    
9821  Soil testing  X    
9822  Storage/drying  X  X 
9823  Licences/permits  X    
9824  Telephone  X    
9828  Salaries paid to spouse or common-law partner  X    
9830  Prepared feed (35 percent of non-itemized invoices)  X  X 
9831  Custom feeding (50 percent of non-itemized invoices)  X  X 
9897  Other  X    
Total E  NISA non-qualifying commodity purchases  X  X 
9765  Machinery lease/rental       
9796  Land clearing and draining       
9805  Interest (real estate, mortgage, other)       
9810  Property taxes       
9811  Rent (land, buildings, pastures)       
9825  Quota rental (tobacco, dairy)       
9826  Gravel       
9827  Purchases of commodities resold       
9829  Motor vehicle interest and leasing costs       
9935  Allowance on eligible capital property       
9936  Capital cost allowance       
9937  Mandatory inventory adjustments - prior year       
9938  Optional inventory adjustments - prior year       
9896  Other       
* The following program payments are not included as revenue in the production margin calculation: 
Canada-Ontario Grain and Oilseed payment; Canada-Ontario Grain Stabilization payment; Dairy 
Subsidy; Permanent Cover Practices; Industry Transition Production Assistance Program; Market 
Revenue Insurance payments for grain, oilseeds, special crops, edible horticulture, and non-edible 
horticulture; Transitional Financial Assistance Program; Production Insurance Premium Adjustment. 
Source: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada   Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  A. Mussell and L. Martin 
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 of farms 
Field crops  6,158 
Vegetables and fruit  993 
Green house (F&V)  123 
Poultry  101 
Dairy  435 
Swine  900 
Beef cow-calf  1,452 
Feedlot  163 
Tobacco  709 
Total  11,034 
Table 3  Stability in Ontario Cash Crop Farms’ Gross Margins and Production Margins,  
CAIS vs. Previous Programs 
 
Cash crops  Average gross margin ($)  Normal deviation below average ($) 









0 - 25,000  4,181  7,532  10,569  4,824  3,165  844 
25,000 - 50,000  9,967  17,139  18,530  7,126  3,627  1,284 
50,000 - 100,000  22,360  34,478  34,360  10,542  4,520  1,963 
100,000 - 250,000  50,771  72,064  71,262  19,595  8,820  3,702 
250,000 - 500,000  110,913  146,053  145,446  37,622  19,845  9,405 
500,000 - 1,000,000  197,773  258,974  252,261  64,154  30,989  14,283 
> 1,000,000  405,806  459,486  488,837  132,939  100,466  49,441 
Cash crops  Average production margin ($)  Normal deviation below average ($) 









0 - 25,000  10,553  13,912  16,949  4,692  3,100  411 
25,000 - 50,000  20,736  27,893  29,284  6,973  3,580  782 
50,000 - 100,000  37,532  49,650  49,532  10,363  4,585  1,274 
100,000 - 250,000  73,211  94,503  93,702  18,640  8,296  2,332 
250,000 - 500,000  149,238  184,378  183,771  34,620  17,480  5,978 
500,000 - 1,000,000  248,236  309,437  302,724  62,865  30,794  9,812 
> 1,000,000  474,829  528,509  557,861  121,689  90,094  25,590 
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Table 4  Stability in Ontario Hog Farms’ Gross Margins and Production Margins,  
CAIS vs. Previous Programs 
 
Hogs  Average gross margin ($)  Normal deviation below average ($) 









0-25,000  9,402  14,565  24,232  7,370  5,014  189 
25,000 - 50,000  6,054  11,458  14,273  6,032  4,314  1,447 
50,000- 100,000  14,844  23,048  23,515  9,337  5,552  1,968 
100,000 - 250,000  32,111  46,420  44,494  12,740  6,091  2,929 
250,000 - 500,000  66,399  88,034  82,895  22,021  11,865  7,400 
500,000 - 1,000,000  112,574  144,023  136,019  44,692  28,468  20,155 
> 1,000,000  314,838  359,052  356,719  143,412  115,094  87,351 
Hogs  Average production margin ($)  Normal deviation below average ($) 









0-25,000  17,885  23,049  32,716  9,226  7,076  135 
25,000 - 50,000  16,636  22,040  24,855  6,670  4,793  1,454 
50,000- 100,000  28,424  36,628  37,095  9,040  5,277  1,415 
100,000 - 250,000  53,391  67,700  65,774  13,386  6,698  2,778 
250,000 - 500,000  105,792  127,426  122,288  24,511  14,321  8,684 
500,000 - 1,000,000  188,093  219,541  211,538  46,405  30,332  20,170 
> 1,000,000  532,062  576,275  573,942  166,924  134,809  108,089 
 
Table 5  Stability in Ontario Beef Cow-Calf Farms’ Gross Margins and Production Margins,  
CAIS vs. Previous Programs 
 
Cow-calf  Average gross margin ($)  Normal deviation below average ($) 









0-25,000  2,566  5,118  7,999  5,414  4,316  1,637 
25,000 - 50,000  8,015  11,034  12,226  5,470  3,951  2,270 
50,000- 100,000  15,149  20,111  20,841  8,771  6,270  3,363 
100,000 - 250,000  24,203  33,519  35,051  14,252  9,752  4,353 
250,000 - 500,000  38,100  53,649  55,340  26,029  17,980  10,310 
500,000 - 1,000,000  55,540  73,768  77,136  29,416  21,591  8,988 
Cow-calf  Average production margin ($)  Normal deviation below average ($) 









0-25,000  9,509  12,061  14,942  5,307  4,278  1,131 
25,000 - 50,000  17,846  20,864  22,056  5,455  4,026  1,988 
50,000- 100,000  27,887  32,849  33,579  8,718  6,251  2,883 
100,000 - 250,000  41,243  50,559  52,090  14,248  9,867  3,820 
250,000 - 500,000  63,794  79,343  81,034  26,149  17,981  8,475 
500,000 - 1,000,000  85,953  104,180  107,548  31,546  23,533  9,406 
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Table 6  Stability in Ontario Beef Feedlot Farms’ Gross Margins and Production Margins,  
CAIS vs. Previous Programs 
Beef feedlot  Average gross margin ($)  Normal deviation below average ($) 









> 1,000,000  138,880  175,950  204,718  113,717  94,181  42,716 
Beef feedlot  Average production margin ($)  Normal deviation below average ($) 









> 1,000,000  216,522  175,950  204,718  111,861  149,201  95,523 
 
Table 7  Stability in Ontario Fruit and Vegetable Farms’ Gross Margins and Production Margins, 
CAIS vs. Previous Programs 
 
Fruit & veg  Average gross margin ($)  Normal deviation below average ($) 









0-25,000  6,239  9,771  15,484  7,946  6,562  1,694 
25,000 - 50,000  8,564  13,743  17,721  8,153  4,984  2,494 
50,000- 100,000  21,222  31,547  30,926  11,695  6,838  5,107 
100,000 - 250,000  44,681  62,917  60,309  22,704  13,366  9,617 
250,000 - 500,000  89,088  119,401  109,580  36,378  20,346  18,456 
500,000 - 1,000,000  189,532  234,093  219,068  69,829  42,360  39,214 
> 1,000,000  518,523  573,713  582,641  207,097  166,540  142,448 
Fruit & veg  Average production margin ($)  Normal deviation below average ($) 









0-25,000  15,168  18,610  24,323  8,387  7,027  1,272 
25,000 - 50,000  25,565  30,744  34,722  8,157  5,455  2,024 
50,000- 100,000  41,679  52,004  51,383  11,156  6,601  3,827 
100,000 - 250,000  88,362  106,868  104,260  24,274  14,794  9,161 
250,000 - 500,000  162,586  192,899  183,079  35,531  19,639  16,086 
500,000 - 1,000,000  338,490  383,050  368,025  65,693  39,952  32,634 
> 1,000,000  912,283  967,472  976,400  205,923  169,601  130,933 
 Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  A. Mussell and L. Martin 
 
 
      37 
Table 8  Stability in Ontario Greenhouse Farms’ Gross Margins and Production Margins,  
CAIS vs. Previous Programs 
Greenhouse  Average gross margin ($)  Normal deviation below average ($) 









0 - 25,000  8,557  11,436  19,643  6,497  5,133  1,367 
25,000 - 50,000  21,142  29,343  33,590  11,445  9,081  1,587 
50,000 - 100,000  17,784  26,309  26,430  8,240  4,241  2,767 
100,000 - 250,000  60,515  76,808  76,463  28,483  19,215  14,312 
250,000 - 500,000  86,644  123,996  122,073  36,923  15,353  10,652 
500,000 - 1,000,000  177,964  217,572  209,403  63,743  38,577  32,238 
>1,000,000  587,646  635,903  622,058  161,666  126,848  125,864 
Greenhouse  Average production margin ($)  Normal deviation below average ($) 









0 - 25,000  18,596  11,436  19,643  8,598  12,725  6,620 
25,000 - 50,000  33,722  29,343  33,590  11,841  17,804  9,077 
50,000 - 100,000  38,396  26,309  26,430  8,660  18,245  16,728 
100,000 - 250,000  104,376  76,808  76,463  32,177  51,459  47,270 
250,000 - 500,000  160,036  123,996  122,073  39,895  65,718  59,790 
500,000 - 1,000,000  305,314  217,572  209,403  64,626  128,258  126,278 
>1,000,000  971,408  635,903  622,058  188,898  433,321  437,092 
 
Table 9  Stability in Ontario Poultry Farms’ Gross Margins and Production Margins,  
CAIS vs. Previous Programs 
Poultry  Average gross margin ($)  Normal deviation below average ($) 









0 - 25,000  1,395  4,649  18,600  8,123  6,572  517 
25,000 - 50,000  32,950  40,042  47,731  19,774  16,398  6,180 
50,000 - 100,000  40,421  50,158  83,299  16,854  11,095  1,240 
100,000 - 250,000  55,748  62,176  63,493  9,873  6,896  4,971 
250,000 - 500,000  101,899  109,509  112,544  26,099  21,174  17,885 
500,000 - 1,000,000  177,733  189,126  191,008  32,662  24,198  18,987 
>1,000,000  398,815  404,855  401,359  69,911  67,556  68,732 
Poultry  Average production margin ($)  Normal deviation below average ($) 









0 - 25,000  12,349  15,602  29,553  8,401  7,058  68 
25,000 - 50,000  51,894  58,986  66,675  21,162  17,633  5,083 
50,000 - 100,000  63,894  73,631  106,772  23,421  18,022  1,691 
100,000 - 250,000  85,748  92,176  93,492  11,763  8,748  4,822 
250,000 - 500,000  147,594  155,204  158,239  23,449  19,446  14,303 
500,000 - 1,000,000  259,954  271,347  273,228  36,943  29,646  21,399 
>1,000,000  566,992  573,032  569,536  72,952  70,817  71,704 Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  A. Mussell and L. Martin 
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Table 10  Stability in Ontario Dairy Farms’ Gross Margins and Production Margins,  
CAIS vs. Previous Programs 
Dairy  Average gross margin ($)  Normal deviation below average ($) 








companions  CAIS 
0 - 25,000  28,307  30,532  46,036  13,862  12,306  2,341 
25,000 - 50,000  32,581  36,336  44,621  10,359  9,258  1,147 
50,000 - 100,000  37,516  40,743  40,821  6,102  4,187  2,874 
100,000 - 250,000  66,127  72,085  72,254  10,207  6,936  5,866 
250,000 - 500,000  126,289  134,216  130,806  16,700  12,136  12,938 
500,000 - 1,000,000  221,070  232,622  226,125  26,029  19,765  21,955 
>1,000,000  453,408  465,076  464,246  67,446  59,513  51,403 
Dairy  Average production margin ($)  Normal deviation below average ($) 








companions  CAIS 
0 - 25,000  42,495  44,720  60,224  19,817  18,574  759 
25,000 - 50,000  48,219  51,973  60,259  15,923  14,809  1,365 
50,000 - 100,000  53,503  56,730  56,809  6,895  5,271  3,049 
100,000 - 250,000  102,488  108,446  108,615  10,495  7,477  5,431 
250,000 - 500,000  196,716  204,643  201,233  17,289  13,356  13,226 
500,000 - 1,000,000  341,979  353,531  347,034  27,531  22,391  23,255 
>1,000,000  758,944  770,612  769,781  79,563  73,448  61,124 
Table 11  Stability in Ontario Tobacco Farms’ Gross Margins and Production Margins, 
CAIS vs. Previous Programs 
Tobacco  Average gross margin ($)  Normal deviation below average ($) 









0 - 25,000  30,710  35,732  54,133  21,865  20,270  2,164 
25,000 - 50,000  39,582  46,930  56,465  20,012  17,720  3,564 
50,000 - 100,000  54,382  65,849  71,281  23,839  18,685  4,252 
100,000 - 250,000  74,722  91,143  93,797  32,241  23,696  10,517 
250,000 - 500,000  119,307  141,470  140,036  44,478  29,984  19,729 
500,000 - 1,000,000  236,962  267,513  267,634  68,233  46,593  35,701 
>1,000,000  504,925  569,019  582,884  181,208  136,582  103,008 
Tobacco  Average production margin ($)  Normal deviation below average ($) 









0 - 25,000  46,941  51,962  70,363  25,821  24,361  3,003 
25,000 - 50,000  57,195  64,543  74,078  21,553  19,366  4,022 
50,000 - 100,000  74,190  85,658  91,089  25,560  20,445  5,148 
100,000 - 250,000  108,016  124,437  127,091  31,510  23,324  8,761 
250,000 - 500,000  180,498  202,661  201,227  42,176  28,530  15,761 
500,000 - 1,000,000  363,322  393,872  393,993  63,734  43,377  28,101 
>1,000,000  707,794  771,888  785,753  130,018  91,870  49,736 Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  A. Mussell and L. Martin 
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Endnotes 
1 The authors wish to acknowledge funding from the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture and 
Food for this project, as well as extensive technical assistance from Mr. Steven Duff of 
the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture and Food. 
2 While CAIS is still treated as the sole farm income stabilization program, programs 
targeted for specific catastrophes such as BSE have since been developed.  
3 An olympic average is composed of five years’ data, with the largest and smallest values 
removed and the average calculated from the median three years’ records.  
4 The effect of this cap is to make deposits of 26 percent irrational, at least in a static 
sense. Given the 70 percent cap on total payments, it can be shown the maximum rational 
deposit is just over 20 percent of reference.  
5 NISA records were generally filed under cash-basis accounting, while CAIS records are 
strictly accrual; this is a limitation in the analysis. However, Martin and Mussell (2003) 
showed that this comparison biases results against CAIS. In other words, if CAIS were to 
provide better stability than previous programs on a cash basis, this conclusion would 
only be strengthened if the comparison were made on an accrual basis. Cash-basis records 
were found to understate actual (accrual) CAIS payments by approximately 18 percent.  
6  This  is  true  despite  the  fact  that  the  results  reflect  a  cap  of  $975,000  per  farm  in 
payments, while CAIS was implemented with a $3,000,000 cap. 